H. Alton Gilbert

P. Alton Gilbert is an assistant vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Dawn M. Peterson provided research assistance,
A Comparison of Proposals to Restructure the U.S. Financial System
INCh thue 1930s, comnuer-cial hanuks buave been permitted to offer only a limnited nanuge of financial services. At the sanue time, fir-ms enugaged in muonfinancial activities, as well as somne in financial industries, have not been pernnitted to owmu banks. Such restrictions were intended to limit the misk of bank failure, to avoid conflicts of intem-est and to prevent undue concentn-ation of financial power-.' In r-ecent years, however-, the separation between banking and othuem-activities has been relaxed somewhat; what's mom-c, Congress is considering funther relaxation, incknding expanding the power-s fum banking orgaruizationus to underwu-ite secun'ities.
One major-meason fom' permitting thue common ownership of banuks arid firms in other industries is based on concern about the n-ole of banks in financial intermediation in the future. Some bank customers have found cheaper sources of credit and other financial services outside thue banking industry. Consequently, some analysts say, restrictions must be relaxed if banks are to survive.' The punpose of this paper is to describe sever-al majomproposals for changing banking restrictions and to 'These restrictions have not been applied to the ownership of banks by individuals. Individuals who own bank stock may own and operate firms in any other industry. Under the Change in Bank Control Act of 1978, individuals and groups of individuals acting in concert must apply to the appropriate federal supervisory agency for permission to acquire the stock of a bank over certain percentages of ownership. See Spong (1985) , pp. 94-95. The bank supervisory agencies may deny permission to purchase bank stock under the following conditions: (1) (2) (3)
The purchase would create a monopoly in any part of the banking industry, The financial condition of the acquiring party could adversely affect the bank, or The competence, experience or integrity of the proposed ownership would not be in the interest of the bank's deposi- 'Corrigan (1987 ), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1987 and Huertas (1986 Huertas ( ,1987 .
tors.
exanune the concepts that undemlie these proposals.
CURRENT' .RESTRICTIONS ON BANKING ACT!!/TTY
At pn'esent, the activities of feder-ally insured cornmem-cial banks are limited essentially to accepting deposits, huolding m-elativelv low-risk securities and making loans. Banking organizations muuay acquire firms engaged in financial activities through bank holding companies tBHCst -corporations that own omue om' nuome banks, In the Bank Holding Company Act BHCA), Congress authorized the Fedenal Reserve Boan'd to detem-nuine what activities are permissible for BHCs; thuese activities, accor-ding to thue act, shouhd be "so closely n-elated to banking as to be a proper incident thereto," Banks genen-ally can engage in most activities that BHCs are allowed to pursue. A major' distinction between luanks and the nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs involves opportunities for geographic expansion. The nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs may have offices throughout the nation, wher-eas nationwide branch banking is not pem'mitted.
h3HCs are subject to the supervision of the Federal Reserve, which periodically inspects them to determine whethen-they are operating in a sound manner and in compliance with regulations, including the capital requirements set by the Fedenal Reserve.
1 On sever-a] occasions, the Federal
Resemve Board has i-uled that BHCs could not undertake certain activities because they were not closely related to banking, might result in conflicts of interest om nuight have subjected the BHCs to greater-risk.'
Table 1 Restrictions on Credit Relationships Between Commercial Banks and Their Nonbank Affiliates
Restrictions in section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act:
Luar.s by banks to ro"rharc ailihacs "usi be ' n, y and adecuately coiratealizec 2 Tota c'odit tn any ole nonoank affiliate is lim'ted to 10 perueni 01 the oan.K S capimal 3 Combined credit to a nonhar' a 1 -iates -s . mite C Mr 70 percem of the oar-cs capita: 4 Pjrurases by nan-cs of unsor.nU assots from qonharik aft' . ates are forbidthn 5. Bark t~ansactionw'th affiliates rinc.uarng :ransachons covo'ed by Inc stntule anc 'rarisactions specif cally exemptl are to he on terms and cnnort:omis that arc cor-s-stem with sate and sound oankir'g oract'c~s
Restrictions in section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act:
1 A banks transactions with. afti',ates mist be or' tenirs anc undcr crcurnstances. iricludin'j credi: standares s-milar to hose of t ered to nonaffilia:e compares 2 A bank ac.t:ng as a tiduc!ary shall nol ourchase securities 'ssuod by an affiliate u'iless sLrch purchases are specified n the fiducrary agreemrerlt 3 A hamik sha not purchase secur:t,es being unde'wr'tte-i by a securities atf irate 4 A oank sna. rrol state or suggest that it is responsible for Ihe obligations oĩts affiliates.
NOTE Legislation In 1982 removeo most of the resmrchons on transactions between comm~rcia' banks that are s,jbsioiaries of the same corporation If a corporation owns 80 percent or more ot the shares of its subsidiary banks the only rest"iction on trar.sact-ors between the subsrdiary banks is that one bank may not sell low ouality assets from another bank in the samne organizaton. See Rose and Tailey 19821 'Spong (1985) , pp. 95-98. The major exception to this involves the nonbank banks, The BHCA, which gave the Federal Reserve jurisdiction over the acquisitions of banks by corporations, defined a bank as one that accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans. Acquisitions of institutions that did not accept demand deposits or make commercial loans were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve in its capacity as regulator of BHCs. These limited-service banks are commonly called nonbank banks. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA) closes that loophole in the law. It places restrictions on the growth and activities of nonbank banks acquired on or before March 5, 1987, and requires firms that acquired nonbank banks after that date to sell them or restrict their activities to those permissible for BHCs. The following restrictions apply to nonbank banks acquired on or before March 5,1987:
(1) They may not engage in new activities, (2) They may not market the goods or services of affiliates or have their banking services marketed through nonbank affiliates, except through those marketing arrangements in effect before March 5, 1987, and (3) Beginning in August 1988, their assets may not rise by more than 7 percent in any 12-month period. CEBA also imposes restrictions on the daylight overdrafts of nonbank banks, Gilbert, Stone and Trebing (1985) . 'Volcker (1986) , pp. 436-38. The following are some of the activities not permissible for BHCs and the dates of denials for those activities by the Federal Reserve Board: underwriting general life insurance (1971), real estate brokerage (1972), land investment and development (1972) , operating a savings and loan association (1974) , operating a travel agency (1976) and acting as a specialist in foreign exchange options on a security exchange (1986). ''N N'N''~",iN"NN,'~~",,//~/ N' /' , N', N,'/~,'' ',NN,N'N'NNN, N~/ 'N",,'N " ' N" '''N4"/N''"N'' ,N,','i ,N'N/"',/',' 'N''"
,, N Some banks offer financial services through their own subsndrar ies 1 he Con ptm olher of the Cun-mcncv determuuines which activities arc permissnhlr for subsidiarncs of national banks, these are gener ally r estm'nrted to activities that are permissi ble fom national banks themselves, In recent years, Second, the pm-oposals differ on the policies necessary to limit the risk assumed by banks, Note that the proposals have some common features designed to limit banking risk. Each proposal in table 2 requires banking omganizations to offer' nonhanking services tlumough subsidiaries or' affiliates; moreover, each includes restrictions on banks lending to their nonhank subsidiaries or affiliates. l'hese proposals rely in part on the legal concept of "corporate separateness," under-which the creditoms of a corporation have no legal claim on the assets of a stockholder, even if that stockholder is another com-poration. 'I'hus, creditor-s of the nonbanking units of a firm that also owrus banks would have no claim on its banks' assets."
Several proposals include special features to limit the risk of bank failure that might result from affiliation of banks and nonbanking firms. The Helter proposal IHeller-(1987)) r'equir-es BHCs to absorb all losses incurred by their bank subsidiaries; nonfinancial firms that acquire BhiCs would ahsomb all losses incurred by their Bl'tCs. The FUIC proposal (Federal Deposit Insurance Corpomation (1987) ) requires bank supervisor-s to audit transactions between banks and their nonbank affiliates or subsidiaries to determine wluether they ar'e detrimental to the banks. The Corrigan pm'oposal (Corrigan (1987) ) relies on direct supervision of the firms that buy banks to limit the risk they assume. Finally, the Litan proposal (titan (1987) The pi-oposals for changing bank r-egulations ar-c concem'ned with their likely effect on bank failures. This section illustrates how tlue probability of bank failure is affected when banks and nonbanking Eimms combine.
Key Factors 4ffecting the Profits and Risks oj'Gnnthining Banks and NOnbanking FirmsĨ
f a bank offer-s nonbanking services, the effect on both the expected rate of return and the variability of returns to the bank's shareholders, as well as the risk of failure for the bank, depend on five factors. Suppose a bank merges with a nonbanking firm. One important factor' is the average level of expected profits or rate of return for the nonbanking service. A second factor is the "risk" associated with the prospective nonbanking service; misk is often measured by the standard deviation of the profits om-rates of meturn. A thir-d factor is the correlation between the profit rates of the bank and aRose (1985) . 9 Black, Miller and Posner (1978) . "Similar proposals have been made by Kareken (1986) , Gilbert (1987) , Tobin (1987) and Forrestal (1987) . Tobin proposes limiting the assets of all banks to short-term, low-risk assets. "The factors that determine the expected value and variance of profits of a firm that buys a bank and a nonbanking firm can be expressed in the following equations:
, where F refers to expected value, V to variance, B to the profits of the bank, N to the profits of the nonbanking firm and COV to the covariance of the profits of the bank and the nonbanking firm, Holding constant the covariance of the two profit streams, a higher variance in the profits of the nonbanking firm means a higher variance in the profits of the combined firms, The variance of the combined profit streams depends on the covariance of the two profit streams. Finally, as the size of the nonbanking firm rises relative to the size of the bank, the variance of the combined profit streams converges to the variance of the profits of the nonbanking firm, returns to shareholders of a firm that buys a bank and a nonbanking firm and operates them under the conditions of the various proposals. One approach to this analysis might involve expressing the mean and variance of the profits of the firm that buys the bank and the nonbanking firm in terms of the mean and variance of the profits of the bank and the nonbanking firm separately, as indicated in the equations above, The problem with this approach is that the distribution of returns to shareholders is not the same as the distribution of profits. In some outcomes, losses exceed the investment of the shareholders; losses to shareholders, however, are no larger than their investment in the firm, The distinction between the distribution of profits and the distribution of returns to shareholders is especially important for this study, since the various proposals involve different rules for truncating the losses to shareholders, Analysis of the mean and variance of returns to shareholders must be based on specific distributions of the profits of the bank and the nonbanking firm, as presented in the text, not on the expected value and variance of the profits.
An analysis of the proposals to restructure the financial system involves an analysis of the mean and variance of the nonhanking firm. A fourth factor is the size of the bank relative to the nonbanking firm. The third and fourth factors are important because the bank may actually reduce its risk by acquiring a nonbanking firm that has a higher-coefficient of variation of profits than the bank. This possibility will be demonstrated later'.
The fifth factor' that must he considered is the "synergies" (increase in profitsi involved in combining banking and nonbanking services in the sanue organization. Offer-ing banking and nonbanking services through the same firm nuay reduce the cost of providing the services and may attract customers who value the wider' ar-ray of services offer-ed by the combined bank-nonbank firm, These synergies could pm'oduce profit rates that exceed the sum of the profit rates of banks and firms in the nonbanking industry opemating as separate corporations.
Some Empirical Estimates of Bates qf Return and Risk
A nurrmbei of studies have investigated the profit r'ates in banking and selected nonbank activities." One finding, demonsti-ated in table 3, is that both the aver-age profit rate and its standard deviation ar-c lower in banking than in sever-al industries that banks would be permitted to entei-under' the r-ecent proposals." Indeed, the standai-d deviation of return on equity, one measure of risk, is lowest in table 3 for-the banking irudustry. Another key finding of these studies is that the profit rates of banks are not positively correlated with the profits of firms in many industr-ies that they would be pernutted to enter. Thus, banks could diver-sify their risk by entering many nonhanking industries, even if the profits of firms in those industries are mor-e variable than those of banks.
" Eisenbeis and Wall (1984) survey the studies. For more recent studies, see Boyd and Graham (1988) and Macey, Marr and Young (1987) . There is evidence that BHCs reduce their risk by offering nonbanking services. See Boyd and Graham (1986) , Wall (1987) and Brewer (1988) . The results of these studies do not indicate the effects on risk of banking institutions entering nonbanking industries as permissible under the proposals in table 2. The nonbanking activities permissible for BHCs now are primarily those permissible for banks, The diversification of risk achieved by offering the nonbanking services currently permissible for BHCs may reflect merely geographic diversification, "Some studies measure returns to shareholders using data on stock prices and dividends, These studies report similar patterns: mean rates of return and variability of returns to shareholders are higher in several of the industries that banking organizations would be permitted to enter than in the commercial banking industry. See Boyd and Graham (1988) , Eisemann (1976) and Macey, Marr and Young (1987) . Table 4 illustrates the potential reduction in variability of bank profits possible through mer'-gers with fir-ms that offer other-financial services. The table illustrates this with the coefficient of variation, a measure of relative risk that is calculated by dividing the standard deviation of the profit mates by the mean. The r-esults demonstrate, using a hypothetical situation involving the relative size of banking and nonbanking components of the firm, that the combined firm can have the same or even lower risk than the hank itseli~even though risk is higher-in the nonhanking industries
The effects of per-mitting hankirug organizations to offer-nonbanking services on the risk and rerur-ns in banking are analyzed using two pr-ohahility distributions of profits, one for a hypotluetical hank and another-for' a nonhanking firm. These probability distr-ibutions, presented in table 5, ar-c designed to r-efiect the results of studies of risk and returns in banking atud various nonbankirig industries sumnuarized above. Profit distributions are combined in table 6 under var-ious assunuptions that reflect the proposals for' r-estm-ucturirug the 1930s, securities affiliates of commercial banks held a large sham-e of tlue investment banking business." In nations where commer-cial banking or-ganizations nuay offer investment banking services, comnuer'cial banking om-ganizations have large shares of the investruuent banking business."
An Illustration
Because banks have not yet entered the various nonbanking industries, there is little evidence on the magnitude of the synergies involved in coruubining banks with other firms.'~There is evidence, however, of svnergies for banks and selected finan cial activities. For example, hefor-e the separ-ation of conunuercial banking and investment banking iru '~Several studies estimate the effects of the combination of services offered by banks on their costs. See Gilligan and Smirlock (1984) and Benston, et. al, (1983) . The results of these studies are not relevant in estimating the effects of nonbanking services on the costs of banks, since the data are for banks subject to current limitations on the services they may offer.
" White (1986) . " Daskin and Marquardt (1983) . the Iinancial system described in table 2. Table 7 shows the returns to shareholder-s and the cxpected loss to the FDIC for the four cases analyzed in table 6.
The illustration is designed to he simple. Differences arnorug the four cases might change under assumptions that would make the analysis more complex. For' instance, the management of the fir-rn that buys the bank and the nonhanking firm is assumed to make no changes that affect the capital ratios or the probability distributions of pi-ofits. Analysis of the cases under alternative assunuptions is beyond the scope of this paper.
The bank begins the current year wuth book value of equity equal to $100. The market value of the hank is assumed to equal its hook value prior to financial restructuring which pernuits tlue affiliation of the bank with the nonhanking firnu. As presented in table 5, the (discrete; probability distributioru of the bank's pr-ofits in the current year has three possible outcomes: a 1 percent chance of a loss of $110, which would cause the bank to fail, a 98 percent chance of a pmofit of 510 (a 10 percent r-eturn on equity) and a I per-ceril chance of a profit of 5130." 'i'able S also presents the probability distribution of profits of a nonhanking firm that, begins the year with hook value capital of $100. The market value of the nonhanking firm is also assumed initially to equal 5100. The nonbanking firm is riskier than the hank: the coefficient of variation of its profits is higher than that of the bank. This specification was chosen to reflect the gm-eater variability of pr'ofits shown in table 3 in some of the industries that banking institutions wish to enter.
The effects of combining the bank and the nonbanking firm in the sanue corporation are examined using thr-ee indicators: the expected return to shareholders as a percent of capital, the coefficient of variation of returns to shareholders of the consolidated firm, and the expected loss to the FDIC from the hank's failure. These measures are calculated in table S for-both the bank and the nonbanking firm as separate organizations to provide benchmarks for comparison. The distribution of returns to shareholders differs from the distribution of profits because losses to shareholders are limited to the amount of their initial investment in tlue firm. Thus, losses to shareholders am-c limited to $100 for the bank and $100 for the nonbanking firm. The expected loss to the FDIC is calculated as fbllows. The bank fails in only one of the three possible outcomes: a loss of $110, with a chance of 1 percent. The loss to the FDIC in that outcome would be 510, since the initial capital of the hank is $100. Thus, the expected loss to the FD1C is $10 (loss to FDIC) X 0.01 (probability; = $0.10.
In deriving the distribution of returns to shareholders in table (3, one must specifi' their investment, which determines their' maximum loss and the denominator used in calculating their expected rate of return. The shareholders' initial investment is measur-ed as the book value of the combined firms. The use of book value, net of any accounting goodwill resulting from the acquisition of the bank and the nonbanking firm, provides a "The large profit of the bank associated with the small probability might reflect the recovery on loans previously charged off as losses or a large favorable change in market interest rates on portfolios of assets and liabilities that do not have matched duration. basis for speci~'ingbankruptcy. Book value also provides a common denominator for comparisons of expected rates of return in the various cases. The market value of the firm that buys the bank and the nonbanking firm will exceed their combined book value. If this were not the case, the combination of these fir-ms in the same corporation would not benefit the shareholder-s.
i'he profits of tlue bank and the nonbanking firm are assumed to be statistically independent and, thus, uncorrelated. This assumption simplifies the analysis; it is also consistent with some of the evidence cited pr'eviously for sever-al industries that banks could enter. For each outcome for the profits of the bank, there are three possible outcomes for the prohts of the nonbanking firm, If combined into one firm, ther'e would be nine possible outcomes for the retur-ns to shareholder's of the consolidated firm, as table 6 illustrates.
Tables 6 and 7 ignore the existence of synergies fiom conubining a bank with a nonbanking firm; they assume that there is no incr'ease in the joint profits resulting fi'onu lower-costs or-a wider-array of services to offer customer-s. As prevrously mentioned, it is difficult to determine the magnitude of such synergies, given that such combinations have been unlawful for many years. Such synergies, of cour-se, must exist to make such combinations attractive to shareholders; investors can easily obtain the benefits of diversification by owning shares of firms with uncorrelated profits-In this paper~however, assumptions about the size of the synergies are unnecessary; the relevant comparisons are made between the various cases. An increase in the levels of profits for each outcome would not alter' the differences among the four cases examined in tables 6 and 7, unless the synergies eliminate bankruptcy in all outcomes.
Merger of the Bank and the Aionbanking Firm: The Simplest Case
Each proposal described in table 2 calls for' the new activities of banking organizations to be conducted thr'ough corpor'ate entities that are separate from banks. This feature of the proposals reflects the view that the chances of bank failure and the potential loss to the FDIC would be higher if the organizations that own banks offered nonbanking senjces thi-ough their-bank subsidiaries, rather than through subsidiaries that are separate from the banks. This view is not valid under all circumstances, as case I in tables 6 and 7 illustrates. In this case, the hank begins offering nonhanking services by merging with the nonbanking firm that has the profit distribution presented in tables. The capital of the bank after the merger is $200. Given the underlying profit distributions in table 5, there is only one outcome in which the bank fails: in outcome # I, the returns from the banking and nonbanking activities yield the largest possible losses. In that outcome, the shareholders lose their total investment. The bank remains in operation in all of the other outcomes. In outcomes #2 and #3, in which the losses from banking operations are large enough to make the bank fail if operating as a separate corporation, the profits from the nonbanking operations and the increased capital of the bank resulting from the merger keep the hank from failing.
The expected loss to the FOIC in case I depends on what happens to the liabilities of the nonbanking firm after the merger. Suppose the nonbanking segment of the merged firm continues to borrow from the same sources it used before the merger. If the claims of these lenders are subordinated to the claims of depositors, the merger might reduce the expected loss to the FDIC, perhaps to zero.
In this illustration, however, the merged organization converts all of its liabilities to federally insured deposits. If the bank involved in the merger goes bankrupt, the FD1C absorbs losses above the capital of $200. tn outcome # 1, because the bank's maximum loss after its merger with the nonbanking firm is $225, the loss to the FDIC is $25. Although the maximum loss to the FDIC is larger after the merger, the expected loss ($25 X 0.0005) is actually smaller after the merger (compare tables S and 7).
The effects that a merger have on the possibility of bank failure and the expected loss to the FD1C depend on the size of the nonbanking firm relative to the bank. To illustrate, suppose the bank merges with a nonbanking firm whose distribution of profits is 10 times as large for each outcome as that presented in table 5 and whose capital is $1,000. In this case, which is not shown in the table, the expected loss to the FDIC would he $2.04, much larger than the expected loss shown in table 7. Thus, in considering a restructuring of the financial system, the size of the bank relative to the nonbanking firm is an important determinant of the expected loss to the FDIC.
4fflhiation qf a flank with a Nonbanking Firm
If banks comnbine tvith nonhanking (irms, one way to limit the FDIC's expected loss is to require that banks remain separate corporations within their parent organizations and limit FDIC insurance only to the deposit liabilities of the banks. Within such structures, the principle of corporate separateness would prevent the nonbanking firm's creditors fi'om claiming the assets of the bank.
The risk and return characteristics of a holding company that buys the bank and the nonhanking firm are presented in case 2. Under this case, labelled affiliation, corporate separateness," losses to shareholders of the holding company resulting from losses by the nonbank subsidiary are limited to the capital of the nonbank subsidiary. The bank does not rescue the nonbank subsidiary by absorbing the additional losses. In turn, if the bank has losses that exceed its capital, the nonbank subsidiary does not rescue the hank by absorbing the additional losses. There is assumed to be no lending among units of the holding company. The holding company lends to neither the bank nor the nonbank subsidiary, amid the bank lends nothing to the nonbank affiliate. The nonbank affiliate borrows, instead, from nonaffiliated lenders; the liabilities of the bank are covered by FDIC insurance.
The expected return to the shareholders is higher and the variability of returns is lower in case 2 than under a similar combination of firms arranged through a merger. Thus, the shareholders benefit more from a combination of the bank and the nonbanking firm as aftiliates of a holding company than through the merger of these firms.
The benefit to the shareholders, however, comes partly at the expense of the FDIC. The FDIC's expected loss is the same in case 2 as in the benchmark case in table S but higher than under the merger. tinder affiliation and corporate separateness, the outcomes in which the FUIC is exposed to losses are determined by the probability distribution of the hank's profits. Under the merger illustrated in case I, in contrast, losses in outcomes # 2 and # 3 that would make the bank fail are absorbed by the profits of the nonbank segment of the merged firm and the capital contributed by the nonbanking unit. Under affiliation and corporate separateness, however, the expected loss to the FOIC does not depend on the size of the bank relative to its nonhank affiliate.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROPOSALS
Merger or 4ffiliation
The cases in tables 6 and 7 indicate that, under some conditions, the risk of F'IJIC loss would be lower if a bank engages in a nonbanking activity directly, rather than through affiliation with a nonbanking firm. In considering proposals for' financial restr'ucturing, therefore, it is unnecessary to prohibit the direct offering of nonhanking services through banks under' all circumstances.
The Financial Services Holding Company (FSHC) Proposal
The proposals by the Association of Bank Holding Companies (LaWar'e 1987)) and the Association of Reserve City Bankers (1987) would permit FSI-ICs to acquire banks as subsidiaries under the condition of affiliation and corporate separateness. The bank could not use its assets to rescue a failing nonbank affiliate, and the FSI-JC would not he required to rescue a failing hank.
A comnparison of case 2 in table 7 with table 5 shows how the formation of FSHCs can affect risk in banking. Affiliation of a hank with a nonbanking firm reduces the probability that the hank will fail only if affiliation yields synergies that raise the profits of the bank for each possible outcome. Thus, affiliations between banks and nonbanking firms that facilitate diversification of risk for shareholdems of banking firms reduce the probability of bank failure and the expected loss to the EDIC on/v if there are synergies from combining banking and nonhanking firms in the same organization.
The Heller "Double liEnbreila" Proposal
The distribution of returns to shareholders under the BelIer (1987) proposal is presented under case 3 in table 6. The implications of this proposal can he illustrated by comparing the distribution of returns to shareholders under various outcomes in cases 2 and 3. Under the Heller proposal, the losses of the hank and nonbank subsidiary in outcome # 1 absorb all of the capital of the holding company. The FDIC has a loss of $10 in that outcome, the amount by which the loss of the hank exceeds its capital. In outcome # 2, the bank has a loss that exceeds its capital, but the holding company is required to cover that loss, drawing on its pmofit of $15 from the nonbanking subsidiary and its capital. The holding company also covers the large loss of the bank in outcome # 3. In outcomes # 4 and # 7, in contrast, the holding company does not absorb all of the losses of the nonhanking subsidiary, Instead, the nonhanking subsidiary goes bankrupt. The holding company writes off its investment of $100, and nonaftiliated lenders absorb the additional loss of $15 in each of these outcomes.
The minimum level of synergies necessary to make combinations of banks and nonhanking firms attractive to investors is higher under the I-teller pr'oposal than under' the NI-IC proposal. The diversification of risk illustrated in case 2 could he achieved through a mutual hind that buys shares in firms in banking and nonbanking industres. Any synergies would make the shareholders' expected rate of return higher with the bank and nonbanking firm combined in the finn under affiliation and corporate separateness than through a mutual fund. To make combinations of banks and nonbanking firms under the Heller proposal attractive to shareholders, synergies would have to exceed a level necessary to compensate the holding company for the expected cost of bailing out the failing bank subsidiary.
The synergies necessary to make the affiliation of banks with nonbanking firms profitable under the Heller proposal would be different for each potential combination of firms. For case 3, the svnemgies would have to raise the returns to shareholders by $0095 to make them equal to the expected returns to shareholders in case 2, and even more to compensate shareholders for the higher variability of returns in case 3. Corrigan (1987) assumes that the methods of insulating banks built into the proposals for FSHCs will be ineffective. This view is based on evidence that BHCs are integrated organizations that have used all of their resources, including those of their bank subsidiaries, to support any nonbank subsidiary in danger of failing. Corrigan also expresses concern that, in approving the acquisition of banks by nonbanking firms, the federal supeivisory authorities will extend the federal safety net to the parent organizations themselves.
The Corrigan Proposal
The Effects of Loans to Nonbank Affiliates on
Stockholder Wealth -The Corrigan proposal reflects these views on the relationship between banks and their parent organizations. Case 4 in tables 6 and 7 examines whether such concerns reflect rational, profit-maximizing behavior. The Corrigan proposal assumes that firms are willing to risk the assets of their bank subsidiaries to aid their' non bank subsidiaries. One way for a holding company to do this is to allow the bank to lend directly to the nonbank subsidiary. To illustrate this, the bank in case 4 lends $10 to the nonbank affiliate at a zero interest rate, thus subsidizing the nonbank subsidiary at the expense of the bank.
Several assumptions have been made to derive the probability distributiomi of returns for shareholders of the holding company. First, the bank loan is assumed to be subordinated to other debt of the nonbank affiliate. tf the nonbank affiliate goes bankrupt, therefore, the bank absorbs the first $10 of losses to creditors. Second, the interest rate on riskless assets is assumed to be 5 percent. The distribution of profits for the bank is derived by subtracting $0.50 from the profits for each possible outcome presented in table 5; this reduction reflects the opportunity cost of foregoimig an alternative investment of $10 at the riskless rate.
The nonbank subsidiary saves $1053 in interest expense on the $10 it borrows from the bank; this is the amount that a risk-neutral lender charges to compensate for the risk-free rate of 5 percent and the 5 percent chance of losing the $10 principal and foregoing the interest income if the nonbanking firm goes bankrupt.' 8
The effects of this loan on the distribution of shareholders' returns are illustrated in table 6 under case 4. In outcomes # 1, #4 and # 7, the bankruptcy of the nonbanking firm imposes an additional loss of $10 on the bank. In outcome # 1, in which the bank has its largest losses, the FDIC absorbs a loss of $20.50 ($10 loss from the underlying distribution in tables, $0.50 loss of interest income on the loan to the nonbank affiliate and $10 loss on the loan to the nonbank affiliate).
The cost saving by the nonbank affiliate due to the zero interest loan from the bank raises the returns to shareholders by $1053 in all outcomes except those in which the nonbank affiliate goes bankrupt. The return to shareholders is $0.01 higher in case 4 than in case 2; this difference is not large enough, however, to raise the expected rate of return in table 7 by I basis point. The important difference between the distributions of returns in case 4 and case 2 is that the coefficient of variation of the returns is higher in case 4. Thus, it is not in the shareholders' interest to have their bank lend to its nonbank subsidiary, even at a subsidized rate. Such loans make their returns more variable.
Typically, bank supervisors would make such a loan even less attractive to the shareholders. Because the loan to the nonbank affiliate raises the expected loss to the FDIC, bank supervisors would require the bank to maintain a higher capital ratio. Though the bank could raise its capital ratio by reducing its total assets while keeping its capital unchanged, the asset reduction would reduce the level of profits for each possible outcome the bank faces.
This analysis is consistent with evidence that few banks make loans to their nonbank affiliates up to the limits allowed by regulation. Rose and Talley (1983) 
Banking Risk under Assumptions Other Than
Profit Maximization -The distribution of returns in cases 2 and 4 reflect the assumption that, if the bank does not lend to the nonbank affiliate, the affiliate's bankruptcy does not affect the bank's profits. In a few cases, however, the bankruptcy of a nonbank subsidiary of a holding company has induced depositors to withdraw their deposits from the bank subsidiary.'°The management of a holding company, therefore, might justify loans from a bank subsidiary to a nonbank affiliate as a way to prevent the nonbank subsidiary from going tm The interest rate that the nonbank affiliate would pay to borrow from a nonaffiliated lender is determined by calculating the rate that would make the expected return on such a loan equal to the risk-tree interest rate. Let rI be the interest rate on the loan and rs the risk-free rate. In lending $10 to the nonbank affiliate, there is a 95 percent chance of collecting the principal plus interest at the rate rI and a 5 percent chance of losing the principal and collecting no interest. The expected returns on the alternative investments are calculated as follows: ' 9 Cornyn, et. al. (1986) . bankrupt and thus make depositors less concerned about the safety of their deposits. In this case, the costs of bailing out the nonbankimig subsidiary might be less than the cost of adverse reaction by depositors.
There have been several cases in which the management of a BHC used the resources of a bank subsidiary to aid a nonbank affiliate in distr'ess. In the mid-1970s, for example, the holding company that owned the l-tamilton National Bank of Chattanooga, Tennessee, arranged for the bank to buy low-quality mortgages from a mortgage banking affiliate. The mortgage purchase was an important factor that led to the failure of the bank." In October 1987, to cite another case, the Continental Illinois National Bank made a loan that exceeded its limit for loans to one customer to a subsidiary that deals in options. The subsidiary suffered a large loss after the sharp fall in stock prices that month.
The rationalization behind bank loans to bail out the nonbank affiliate overlooks an alternative that might be more favorable to the shareholders of the holding company: let the nonbank subsidiary go bankrupt and sell the bank to another party. Losses to the holding company would be limited to its investment in the nonbank subsidiary, with nonaffihiated lenders forced to absorb any additional losses. If potential bidders are concerned that the bank made loans to the failing nonbank affiliate or in some way assumed responsibility for the debts of that affiliate, the FDIC could facilitate the sale by offering to reimburse the winning bidder for any losses resulting from the failure of the nonbank affiliate.
Management of the holding company may prefer to have the bank absorb the losses necessary to bail out the failing nonbank affiliate, rather than sell the bank, which will result in the loss of their' jobs. It may be in management's interest to arrange for the bank to lend to the nonbank subsidiary and pray that some favorable outcome helps the holding company remain solvent. The possibility of such action is why government supemvisors must remain aware of any financial problems in firms that own banks and must subject the bank subsidiaries of those firms to particularly close supervision.
The analysis in tables 6 and 7 of a bank lending to its nonbank affiliate is based on the assumption that the loan is used for legitimate business purposes. Loans from a bank to a nonbank affiliate, of cour'se, could he made for fraudulent purposes. Suppose a bank is permitted to make a loan of any amount to an affiliate. One method of stealing from a bank would he to buy the bank through a holding company, arrange for a loan that exceeded the investment of the holding company in the hank and disappear with the proceeds of the loan.
The potential for fraud indicates that it may be prudent to prDhibit loans to affiliates that exceed the capital of a bank. This pr'ohibition would not prevent all forms of fraud in banking but its violation would indicate to the bank supervisors when a bank is vulnerable to this type of fraud. It is also pr'udent to screen the background of those who buy banks through holding companies, as the federal bank regulatory agencies do when individuals buy banks. 'rhe FDIC (1987) proposal calls for greater authority to audit the terms of any loans banks make to affiliates or subsidiaries. This proposal does not indicate what bank examiners would look for in such audits. Audits to detect fraud would be appr'opriate.
The Safe Bank Proposal
The so-called safe bank pr'oposal (Litan 1987) ) is intended to reduce the expected level and standard deviation of profit rates of banks subject to the safe bank" asset restrictions. As the appendix indicates, for each $100 of assets shifted from business loans to Treasury bills, the revenue of the safe hank would decline by $1.26. The asset limitations for safe banks maybe so restrictive that they would prevent many affiliations of banks with nonbanking firms that would promote diversification or benefit society through synergies.
One way to evaluate the safe banking proposal is to compare the size of the synergies necessary to make bank acquisitions profitable for nonbanking firms to the syner-gies necessary under alternative proposals. Suppose the hank had loans of $600." If the bank becomes a safe bank by reinvesting the $600 in Treasury bills, its revenue falls by $7.56. It "Ibid., p. 186. "Suppose the bank has a capital~to~asset ratio of 10 percent.
For all federally insured commercial banks, the average ratio of loans to assets is about 60 percent. Thus, $600 is a reasonable level for loans of the hypothetical bank with capital of $100 and a 10 percent capital ratio.
must, however, continue to pay competitive interest r-ates on deposits after becoming a subsidiary to avoid a decline in its deposits. Thus, synergies from the operation of the bank as a subsidiary must be worth at least $7.56 to the holding company. This amount can be compared to the syner--gies necessary to make the acquisition of a bank subsidiary profitable under the Heller proposal, which is $0095 for the case examined above.
This lar-ge difference reflects the fact that the safe bank proposal imposes a significant opportunity cost on a nonbanking firm that buys a hank under each possible outcome. The Helier proposal, on the other hand, imposes a loss on the nonbanking firm under-an unlikely outcomethe failure of the bank subsidiary. These comparisons suggest that fewer combinations of banking and nonbanking firms that would promote diversification of risk and, possibly, mor'e efficient use of resources would be viable under the safe bank proposal than under-the Heller proposal.
CONCLUSIONS
Several barriers separ'ating banking from other industries have been removed in recent years, while Congress debates a more complete restructuring of the financial system. Much evidence indicates that banking organizations could diversi~yrisk by affiliating with flr'ms in a wide variety of other industries, even those with more variable profits than the banking industry. 'rhis paper illustrates the potential for risk diversification through the common ownership of a hypothetical bank and nonbanking firm.
The illustration has several implications for current proposals for restructuring the financial system. Banks ar-c not necessarily made safer by requiring that all nonbanking activities be conducted through separate subsidiaries. On the contrary, banks maybe less vulnerable to failure if some nonbanking activities are offered through the banks directly. Moreover, the expected loss of federal deposit insurance funds may be lower even if the nonbanking activities are financed through insured deposits.
The major proposals for restr'ucturing the financial system would permit firms in various industries to buy banks and operate them as separate subsidiaries. Some of the proposals build in safeguar-ds to prevent nonbanking firms from using the resources of their bank subsidiaries in ways that would increase both the chance for bank failure and the expected loss of the federal deposit insurance funds. These r-estrictions are based oru the presunuption that, without such safeguards, nOnbanking firnus would use the resour'ces of their bank subsidiaries to benefit their' nonharuk subsidiaries.
The analysis in this paper-indicates that the shareluolders of a holding company generally do not benefit by luaving their bank subsidiary lend at a subsidized interest rate to the nonbank subsidiary. In fact, shareholders are made worse off by such transactions because the holding company profits become more variable. Tr-ansactions that benefit nonbank subsidiaries at the expense of hank subsidiaries do not increase the shareholders' wealth. The greatest danger in banks lending to affiliates involves management of holding companies attempting to save their jobs by bailing out nonbank subsidiaries and fraudulent schemes to steal from banks through loans to affiliates.
Two of the proposals place special corustraints on the nonbanking firms that buy banks to limit the risks of bank failure. One proposal requires that the holding companies absorb all losses incur'red by banks, up to the holding company's total capital. The other proposal requires the bank subsidiaries of nonbanking firms to hold only lowrisk liquid assets. Both proposals raise the level of synergies necessary to make the acquisition of banks by nonbanking firms profitable. Of these pr-oposals, the safe banking proposal is the more restrictive. Some consolidations of banking and nonbanking finns that would yield social benefits in the form of higher' profits and reduced variation in stockholder returns would not be attractive to shareholders under the safe banking proposal hut would be attractive under-other pr-oposals. The Opportunity Cost Of Holding Safe Assets
The safe bank proposal Litan 1987)) would put the bank subsidiaries of nonhanking firms at a disadvantage in competing for deposits by restricting the r'eturn oru their-investments. This disadvantage could be offset slightly by waiving deposit insurance premiums for' the subsidiaries of nonbanking firms. Under the requirements for holding only safe assets, the subsidiaries of nonbanking firms would not expose the federal deposit insurance funds to potential losses; therefore, an argument could be made for exempting "safe" banks from deposit insurance premiums.
The opportunity cost of investing in Treasury securities instead of loans is estimated using data from the functional cost analysis program of the Federal Reserve. A change in the composition of a bank's assets affects its interest revenue and expenses. The functional cost data includes information on interest income and expenses allocated to various categories of loans, as well as expenses involved in purchasing and holding securities, Table Al indicates that the gross yields on loans almost always exceed those on three-month fleasury bills. Net yields on loans, which reflect expenses and losses, are lower' than the net yields on Treasury bills in some years for mortgage and installment loans. Table AZ isolates the comparisons between net yields on 'Treasury bills and those on three categodes of loans. Net yields on mor'tgages and installment loans tend to fall below the net yields on Treasur bills in periods of sharp increases in 75 interest rates. The most stable spread is that between the net yield on commercial and other loans and the net yield on Treasury securities. On average, banks lose $1.26 in net income before income taxes per dollar' tr-ansferi'ed from commercial loans to Treasury bills.
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